

opentext™

AI zkušenosti v Security Analytics


Petr Hněvkovský, CISM, CISA, CISSP, CEH
Sr. Manager | Cybersecurity Solutions Consulting
Duben 2024




Úspěch generativní AI zajistil maximální humbuk!



Dvě desetiletí inovací AI s více než 371 patenty AI



Významné AI inovace kybernetické bezpečnosti



Použijte **správnou AI** pro **správný scénář!**

AppSec testovací problémy

- Omezení šumu
- Časově náročný proces
- Nedostatek auditorů AppSec
- Opakující se všední kontrola

Použijte **správnou AI** pro **správný scénář!**

AppSec testovací problémy

- Omezení šumu
- Časově náročný proces
- Nedostatek auditorů AppSec
- Opakující se všední kontrola

	Random Forest	ChatGPT
Classification performance	Equal or better	Equal or worst
Parameters	8 million ¹	1.76 trillion ³ (~950,000 larger)
Memory	50 MB ¹	45 GB ² (~1300 times larger)
Training cost	< \$30.67	> \$100,000,000 ⁴
Training CPUs/GPUs	1-3	~10,000 ⁵
Prediction speed	milliseconds	seconds

Fortify Audit Assistant první a přelomový od 2019

[1] Based on 10 forests, average of 114 trees, with an average maxDepth of 23. Computed using our default tunings, one forest per language

[2] Estimate from <https://updf.com/knowledge/what-is-gpt-4/>

[3] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4> and Sam Altman


[4] Based on >700K FoD data, assuming 3xc5.large AWS instances on running for 12 hours, for 10 languages

[5] <https://www.fierceelectronics.com/sensors/chatgpt-runs-10k-nvidia-training-gpus-potentially-hundreds-more>

Použijte **správnou AI** pro **správný scénář!**

AppSec testovací problémy

- Omezení šumu
- Časově náročný proces
- Nedostatek auditorů AppSec
- Opakující se všední kontrola



Okamžité výsledky

- Prioritizace pro výsledky s velkým dopadem
- Snížení manuálního úsilí
- Granulární označování
- Lidský asistent s AI

Fortify Audit Assistant první a přelomový od 2019

Poučení se z AI pro vytvoření vhodnějších řešení

Klíčové výzvy SOC 2020

- Nedostatek talentů
- Dlouhá doba expozice
- Rozvoj hrozeb
- Informační přetížení
- Manuální opakující se úkoly

Robotic Driven SOC 1/4
AI and RPA Improving SecOps
RoboSOC Security Guide



Získejte okamžitý přehled bez technické znalosti

The screenshot shows a Slack interface for a channel named #robosoc. The left sidebar lists channels like #general, #random, and #robosoc, along with direct messages. The main chat area shows a conversation between Petr Hnevkovsky and ArcBot. Petr Hnevkovsky asks if ArcBot is interested in phishing incidents. ArcBot responds that there were 54 reported phishing incidents in two weeks, an increase of 8 percent compared to 50 in the prior period. Petr Hnevkovsky asks for more details, and ArcBot provides information about a BlackDust phishing campaign, mentioning 4 reported incidents.

The screenshot shows a chat window with a message from Petr Hnevkovsky at 11:10: "what russian group targeted ukrainian scada". Below it is a response from ArcBot APP at 11:10: "Sandworm Team is a Russian cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009. The group likely consists of Russian pro-hacktivists. Sandworm Team targets mainly Ukrainian entities associated with energy, industrial control systems, SCADA, government, and media. Sandworm Team has been linked to the Ukrainian energy sector attack in late 2015. [1] [2]". A "More Info" button is visible. Below the ArcBot response, there is a question: "Is there anything else you are interested in?" followed by a "Your Response:" field containing the text: "I'm not interested in anything else." At the bottom, there is a summary message: "OK, great, I have mailed you a summary of our discussion and findings for your reference... Have a nice day :)"


Vývoj přesných a spolehlivých schopnosti AI a RPA

RoboSOC*

User & Entity
Behaviour
Analytics

Security
operations
automation
response

Global adversary
analytics



ArcSight Security Analytics

Search

USER

- Home
- Dashboards

THREAT MANAGEMENT

- Stories
- Playbooks
- Cases

ANALYSIS

- SQL Explorer
- ML Models
- Tuning

SYSTEM

- Data Sources
- Endpoints

- Mike Cyze
- Settings + Users

Service Account Remote Login Unusual Executables +


ATT&CK T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059

On October 5th, the service account `svc_data_backup` exhibited suspicious behavior by using a Remote Interactive logon and running uncommon executables `hikaru.exe`, `ngghjkrzdfgcuagqx.exe`, `whoami.exe`, and `nltest.exe`. Subsequently, two other service accounts—`svc_service_accounting` and `svc_service_booking`—displayed similar anomalous activities, as flagged by correlation rule `FMR10001023`, on October 10th and 11th.

Aviator generated this **EXTREME RISK** story on Oct 11 01:05 from 2,105 anomalies, 16 alerts, 1,439,389 events and involves 6 users, 12 machines, 3 IP addresses

Connections Timeline Raw Events Network Correlations ML Models History

All Connections



Aviator

The system account is sending large amounts of data to the IP address `172.28.174.27` at times when this account is normally inactive.

Aviator recommends the following actions:

- Isolate Affected Accounts:** Immediately isolate the service accounts `svc_data_backup`, `svc_service_accounting`, and `svc_service_booking` from the network to prevent any potential lateral movement or data exfiltration.

Show me how... **Undo**
- Investigate Executables:** Conduct a forensic analysis on the uncommon executables (`hikaru.exe`, `ngghjkrzdfgcuagqx.exe`, `whoami.exe`, `nltest.exe`) to determine their functionality and origin. Remove or quarantine any malicious software found.

Show me how... **Just do it!**

[Show all 3 recommendations...](#)

- `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` triggered a violation for rule `CorrelationRuleSrv 1` time.

Workflow Violation st_cnts_2310

Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `hikaru.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint
- Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM**

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `reg.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint
- Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM**

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `net.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint
- Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM**

`svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` worked in this hour, which was very unusual based on past activity.

Přesná detekce vnitřní hrozby pomocí jednoho zdroje

Snadno pochopitelné a kvalitní zacílení

- Podniková špionáž
- Útoky na hesla
- Špatné IT postupy
- Exfiltrace dat



opentext™ | ArcSight Intelligence CE 24.1 | Entities | Explore | Events | Dashboard | Sign out, demo@opentext... | ⚙️

Type to filter entities by name, tag, or type...

Users	Domains	Websites	Files	Machines	Projects	Servers	Printers	Shares	Cloud Apps	Resources	IP Addresses
1,015	25	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	17	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
85	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Top Risky Entities

7	38	93	910
Extreme Risk	High Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk

#	Current Risk	Entity	Potential Threat	Riskiest Anomaly/Violation	
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	100	joshua.newman	Credential Access	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 10:00 PM Failed login at CORTEX-SSRV00.interset.ext , rare for joshua.newman .
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	100	shiela.mathis	Discovery	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 3:00 PM Attempted to access inactive domain intranet/sites/NSX/Lists/frsf_contacts .
<input type="checkbox"/>	3	97	OTTAWADC.interset.com	Credential Access	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 10:00 PM Failed login at OTTAWADC.interset.com , rare for joshua.newman .
<input type="checkbox"/>	4	96	twitter.com/	Command and Control	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 11:00 PM Received 136MB of data from twitter.com/ .

Kognitivní a reaktivní kybernetická obrana (XDR+)

Varovné signály

Dřívější detekce a vyhledávání hrozeb s cílem minimalizovat dobu zdržení.

Signály útočníka ze vzdáleného prostoru

Early warning signals and adversary analytics that indicate an imminent or impending attack.

Signály chování

User behavior analytics to identify insider threats often associated with compromised accounts/credentials.

Korelace

Real-time correlation that provides instant visibility into known threats as well as suspicious patterns.

Síťová detekce

Network telemetry to detect lateral movement, and anomalous traffic and provide forensic playback.

Řízení identit a koncových bodů

Identity account and endpoint blocking, containment, re-imaging, and forensics

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix

WoA
WoC

Warnings of Attack
Warnings of Compromise



IoA

Indicators of Attack



IoC

Indicators of Compromise





Kybernetická odolnost

- Ochrana aplikací, dat a identit
- Přesná detekce a automatizovaná reakce



Lidský kapitál

- Virtuální asistenti
- Partnerství mezi lidmi a umělou inteligencí
- $1 + 1 = 3$



Digitální transformace

- Aviator podpoří Váš růst
- Umožněte své AI využívat svá data

opentext™

**Jak může AI Aviator
zabezpečit vaše podnikání?**


opentext.ai | phnevkovsky@opentext.com



opentext™



Generative AI achievement unlocked: **maximum hype!**



Plateau will be reached:

- less than 2 years
- 2 to 5 years
- 5 to 10 years
- ▲ more than 10 years
- ⊗ obsolete before plateau

As of July 2023

[gartner.com](https://www.gartner.com)


Source: Gartner
© 2023 Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 2079794




Two decades of AI innovations with 371+ AI patents

FOUNDATIONS

NEW FUTURE



Notable **cybersecurity AI** innovation milestones



Use the **right AI** for the **right use case!**

AppSec testing burden

- Noise reduction needed
- Time Intensive process
- AppSec auditor shortage
- Repetitive mundane reviews

Use the **right AI** for the **right use case!**

AppSec testing burden

- Noise reduction needed
- Time Intensive process
- AppSec auditor shortage
- Repetitive mundane reviews

	Random Forest	ChatGPT
Classification performance	Equal or better	Equal or worst
Parameters	8 million ¹	1.76 trillion ³ (~950,000 larger)
Memory	50 MB ¹	45 GB ² (~1300 times larger)
Training cost	< \$30.67	> \$100,000,000 ⁴
Training CPUs/GPUs	1-3	~10,000 ⁵
Prediction speed	milliseconds	seconds

Fortify Audit Assistant first & ground breaking since 2019

[1] Based on 10 forests, average of 114 trees, with an average maxDepth of 23. Computed using our default tunings, one forest per language

[2] Estimate from <https://updf.com/knowledge/what-is-gpt-4/>

[3] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4> and Sam Altman

[4] Based on >700K FoD data, assuming 3xc5.large AWS instances on running for 12 hours, for 10 languages

[5] <https://www.fierceelectronics.com/sensors/chatgpt-runs-10k-nvidia-training-gpus-potential-1000s-more>

Use the right AI for the right use case

AppSec testing burden

- Noise reduction needed
- Time Intensive process
- AppSec auditor shortage
- Repetitive mundane reviews



Immediate actionable results

- Prioritization on high impact results
- Reduce manual effort
- Granular labelling
- Human AI assistant

Fortify Audit Assistant first & ground breaking since 2019

Learning from AI to build better suited solutions

2020 Key SOC challenges


- Talent shortage
- Long exposure time
- Evolving threats
- Information overload
- Manual repetitive task

Robotic Driven SOC 1/4
AI and RPA Improving SecOps
RoboSOC Security Guide




Innovation Lab

Gain immediate insight without technical burden



The screenshot shows a Slack interface for the #robosoc channel. The left sidebar lists channels (#general, #random, #robosoc) and direct messages. The main area shows a conversation starting with Petr Hnevkovsky at 11:07: "OK, great, I have mailed you a summary of our discussion and findings for your reference... Have a nice day :)". ArcBot APP responds at 11:07: "are we targeted by phishing". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:07: "Are you interested in phishing incidents targeting our company?". ArcBot APP responds at 11:07: "Your Response: Yes". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:07: "Are you looking for a particular phishing attack or general phishing status...". ArcBot APP responds at 11:07: "Your Response: General". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:07: "What trend period are you looking for?". ArcBot APP responds at 11:08: "last two weeks". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:08: "There were 54 reported phishing incidents in two weeks. That is an increase of 8 percent compared to 50 in the prior (equivalent) period.". ArcBot APP responds at 11:08: "Is there anything else you are interested in?". Petr Hnevkovsky responds at 11:08: "Your Response: Tell me about a particular phishing attack.". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:08: "Please specify the name of the phishing campaign.". ArcBot APP responds at 11:08: "black dust". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:08: "OK, let me check the BlackDust phishing campaign for you...". ArcBot APP responds at 11:08: "There are 4 reported incidents of BlackDust.". Petr Hnevkovsky asks at 11:08: "Is there anything else you are interested in?". ArcBot APP responds at 11:08: "1. Tell me about a particular phishing attack.". The bottom of the screen shows a message input field with the text "Message #robosoc".



The screenshot shows a chat conversation. Petr Hnevkovsky (11:10) asks: "what russian group targeted ukrainian scada". ArcBot APP (11:10) responds: "Sandworm Team is a Russian cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009. The group likely consists of Russian pro-hacktivists. Sandworm Team targets mainly Ukrainian entities associated with energy, industrial control systems, SCADA, government, and media. Sandworm Team has been linked to the Ukrainian energy sector attack in late 2015. [1] [2]". Below the response is a "More Info" button with a book icon. Petr Hnevkovsky asks: "Is there anything else you are interested in?". ArcBot APP responds: "Your Response: I'm not interested in anything else.". Petr Hnevkovsky asks: "OK, great, I have mailed you a summary of our discussion and findings for your reference... Have a nice day :)".


Derived new accurate & reliable AI and RPA capabilities

RoboSOC*

User & Entity Behaviour Analytics

Security operations automation response

Global adversary analytics



ArcSight Security Analytics

Service Account Remote Login Unusual Executables +


ATT&CK T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T12

On October 5th, the service account `svc_data_backup` exhibited suspicious behavior by using a Remote Interactive logon and running uncommon executables `hikaru.exe`, `ngghjkrzdfgcuagqx.exe`, `whoami.exe`, and `nltest.exe`. Subsequently, two other service accounts—`svc_service_accounting` and `svc_service_booking`—displayed similar anomalous activities, as flagged by correlation rule `FMR10001023`, on October 10th and 11th.

Aviator generated this **EXTREME RISK** story on Oct 11 01:05 from 2,105 anomalies, 16 alerts, 1,439,389 events and involves 6 users, 12 machines, 3 IP addresses and 1 website.

Connections Timeline Raw Events Network Correlations ML Models History

All Connections



The system account is sending large amounts of data to the IP address 172.28.174.27 at times when this account is normally inactive.

Aviator recommends the following actions:

Isolate Affected Accounts: Immediately isolate the service accounts `svc_data_backup`, `svc_service_accounting`, and `svc_service_booking` from the network to prevent any potential lateral movement or data exfiltration.

Show me how... Undo

Investigate Executables: Conduct a forensic analysis on the uncommon executables (`hikaru.exe`, `ngghjkrzdfgcuagqx.exe`, `whoami.exe`, `nltest.exe`) to determine their functionality and origin. Remove or quarantine any malicious software found.

Show me how... Just do it!

Show all 3 recommendations...

`svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` triggered a violation for rule `CorrelationRuleSrv 1` time.

Workflow Violation st_cnts_2310

Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `hikaru.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint

Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `reg.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint

Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM

It was very unusual that `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` used a process `net.exe`, which has only been used on 1 day by `svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com`.

Execution Rare Processes Used Endpoint

Oct 10, 9 - 10 AM

`svc_service_booking@contsocorp.com` worked in this hour, which was very unusual based on past activity.

Oct 02 02:15



USER

- Home
- Dashboards

THREAT MANAGEMENT

- Stories
- Playbooks
- Cases

ANALYSIS

- SQL Explorer
- ML Models
- Tuning

SYSTEM

- Data Sources
- Endpoints

- Mike Cyze
- Settings + Users

Detect Insider Threat accurately & with one rich source

Easy to understand high-quality insight to

- Data Exfiltration
- Corporate Espionage
- Password Brute Forcing
- Bad IT Hygiene



opentext | ArcSight Intelligence CE 24.1 | Entities | Explore | Events | Dashboard | Sign out, demo@opentext...

Type to filter entities by name, tag, or type...

Users	Domains	Websites	Files	Machines	Projects	Servers	Printers	Shares	Cloud Apps	Resources	IP Addresses
1,015	25	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	17	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
85	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Top Risky Entities

7	38	93	910
Extreme Risk	High Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk

#	Current Risk	Entity	Potential Threat	Riskiest Anomaly/Violation	
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	100	joshua.newman	Credential Access	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 10:00 PM Failed login at CORTEX-SSRV00.interset.ext , rare for joshua.newman .
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	100	shiela.mathis	Discovery	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 3:00 PM Attempted to access inactive domain intranet/sites/NSX/Lists/frsf_contacts .
<input type="checkbox"/>	3	97	OTTAWADC.interset.com	Credential Access	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 10:00 PM Failed login at OTTAWADC.interset.com , rare for joshua.newman .
<input type="checkbox"/>	4	96	twitter.com/	Command and Control	DECEMBER 2ND 2023, 11:00 PM Received 136MB of data from twitter.com/ .

Cognitive / Responsive Cyber Defense (XDR +)

Warning Signals

Threat detection and hunting earlier to minimize dwell time

Far-space Adversary Signals

Early warning signals and adversary analytics that indicate an imminent or impending attack.

Behavioral Signals

User behavior analytics to identify insider threats often associated with compromised accounts/credentials.

Correlation

Real-time correlation that provides instant visibility into known threats as well as suspicious patterns.

Network Detection

Network telemetry to detect lateral movement, and anomalous traffic and provide forensic playback.

Identity and Endpoint Controls

Identity account and endpoint blocking, containment, re-imaging, and forensics

ATT&CK* Enterprise Matrix

WoA
WoC

Warnings of Attack
Warnings of Compromise



IoA

Indicators of Attack



IoC

Indicators of Compromise





Cyber resilience

- Protect apps, data and identities
- Detect & respond



Human capital

- Provide virtual assistants
- Human & AI partnership
 $1 + 1 = 3$



Digital transformation

- Aviator boosts your growth
- Enable your AI with your data


opentext™



**How can AI Aviator
secure your business?**

opentext.ai | phnevkovsky@opentext.com


Security analytics convergence



ArcSight Intelligence unique values



Minutes instead
of days or never



Accurate
Detection



Self-learning
Intelligence



Friction-less
Integration



Reduce
TCO

Enable **your AI models and sensitive data analytics**

AI data challenges now and forever

- Data sprawl
- Compliance mandate
- Sensitive data leak
- Public environments
- Biases & pollution

Discover

- Structured & unstructured

Classify

- Understand risk

Act

- Sanitize & protect

Voltage Fusion Data Privacy and Protection